2005年臺灣憲政改革之制度分析
本館出版品
2005年臺灣憲政改革之制度分析
Taiwan's 2005 Constitutional Reform and its Political Effects
孫學研究
1996-265-7
半年刊
2009/11/12
第07期
P145-173
本文探討2005年憲政改革,在該次修憲過程涉及許多彼此相連的政治議題,這些制度的修改並此相互影響,並且衝擊到既有的政治環境,及參與其中的行為者帶來後續的變遷。這些政治議題包含了立法院席次減半、立委選制改革、立委任期延長為四年以及公民投票取代國民大會成為修憲複決機制。
在研究方法上,本文進行制度設計與實證分析的對話。一方面,檢視憲政改革所採行制度設計背後的論述以及意涵;另一方面,本文利用2008年立法委員選舉以及總統選舉的實證分析,與既有的憲政改革論述進行對話。透過制度設計與實證分析的對話,進一步勾勒出2005年修憲對於民主發展與政治運作所產生的效應。
本文認為首先、席次減半有可能反而導致了法案素質降低、擴大立委權力及加深社會歧異可能性;其次、2008年立委選舉顯示,單一選區兩票制的選舉制度嵌入在臺灣政治版圖並沒有導致兩黨政治,而是產生單一政黨過度比例性;第三、立委任期延長以及選舉時程調整提高了形成一致政府的可能性;第四、公民複決修憲程序可能產生規範層次與實際層次的高度落差。一方面,國會最大黨作為既得利益者降低啟動修憲程序的誘因,另一方面,臺灣民眾對於公民投票的低投票率以及公民複決程序的高門檻,也使得憲法修正案即便進入公民複決程序也有極高的可能遭到否決。
This paper analyzes the related issues in Taiwan's seventh constitutional reform. These issues are: (1) halving the number of seats in the legislature, from 225 to 113; (2) establishing the MMP system; (3) changing the legislative term of office from three to four; and (4) abolishing the National Assembly and adopting the right to referendum. Compared with the 2008 Legislative Yuan election, this paper argues that some effects of these issues are different from their expected outcomes. First, halving the number of seats in the legislature tend to decrease the quality of bills, strengthen the power of legislators, and enlarge social cleavages. Second, Instead of forming a expected two-part system, the MMP electoral system lead to one dominate party system. Third, changing the legislative term of office and almost synchronized the President and Legislative Yuan election could tend to decrease the split-ticketing voting behaviors and increase the possibility to form unified government. Fourth, adopting the right to referendums creates the obvious gaps between the normal level and de facto level. Although public referendums have highly democratic ideals, the high threshold of referendum mechanism could easily obstruct any following constitutional reforms.
國立國父紀念館
臺北市
GPN:2009503228